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AES-256 is still considered quantum safe. Grover's algorithm only weakens symmetric ciphers. Shor's algorithm breaks RSA and ECC outright, so in OT and site-to-site tunnels the key exchange is where migration effort...
European agencies expect post-quantum key exchange to be hybrid during the transition. NSA CNSA 2.0 targets standalone ML-KEM-1024. Here is what that means for OT operators with links between sites, cloud and...
Mosca's theorem turns quantum risk into a timeline: if data must stay secret longer than the time left before a quantum computer arrives, minus your migration time, you are already exposed. This...
Breaking RSA-2048 is now estimated to need fewer than one million noisy qubits, down from 20 million in 2021. This article explains the numbers, why they keep falling, how elliptic curves compare...
A practical comparison of ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024 for site-to-site, edge-to-cloud and remote access links in OT and critical infrastructure, with FIPS 203 sizes, CNSA 2.0 requirements and European agency guidance.
Hybrid post quantum key exchange combines a classical algorithm such as Diffie-Hellman with ML-KEM (FIPS 203) into one session key. This article explains why, how safe ML-KEM is today, and how rekeying...
Shor's algorithm breaks RSA and elliptic curve cryptography, and NIST IR 8547 sets their retirement for 2030 to 2035. AES-256 stays secure. Here is what this means for OT and critical infrastructure...
Harvest now decrypt later means encrypted traffic recorded today could be read once a quantum computer can break RSA and elliptic-curve key exchange. This article explains the timelines, the algorithms at risk...